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MAXIMILIAN KOESSLER j
American naturalization law has been subject to many changes,
both in its fundamentals and in its particulars, during the 150 odd years
which elapsed between its first being shaped by the Act of Congress of
179o and its recent codification in the Nationality Act of I94O. How-
ever, the peculiarly American practice of distinguishing a special cate-
gory of declarant aliens, or in common parlance persons with "first
papers", from other non-citizens was introduced by the Naturalization
Act of I795; and it has since been retained on the statute books, being
presently defined by Section 331 of the Nationality Act of I94O.
At variance with the law of most other countries, an individual
who lawfully enters the United States may not, as a rule, apply at once
for a certificate of citizenship, regardless of the length of his uninter-
rupted residence in this country. Having maintained residence for the
statutory period and having satisfied certain other requirements, he must
make a declaration of his intention to become a citizen.1 Furthermore,
after the expiration of a minimum period, he must apply for "second
papers"; and this application must be made within the period during
which his declaration of intention remains valid.
2
Ostensibly a certificate testifying to the fact that a person has sol-
emnly voiced the desire to become an American citizen, "first papers"
are more than the record of a unilateral declaration. The applicant
must submit to an examination under oath before the clerk of a naturali-
zation court or his deputy; 3 and his application may be denied because
of the applicant's illegal entry, race, or other circumstance relev~fnt as
a ground of exclusion. Consequently the "first papers" represent, in
t Jur. D., University of Austria in Czernowitz; A.M., 1941, Columbia University;
former member of the Vienna bar; author of Enemy Alien Internment: with special
reference to Great Britain and France (1942) 57 PoL. Sci. Q.98, and numerous ar-
ticles in German and French legal periodicals.
x. But many categories of exemption from the declaration of intention are pro-
vided for in the Nationality Act of 1940: e. g., for former American citizens, for
spouses of American citizens, for persons honorably discharged from service in the
armed forces of the United States. 54 STAT. 1145, 1147, 1149 (1940), 8 U. S. C. A.
§§ 711, 717, 724 (1942). The Second War Powers Act, signed by the President on
April 2, 1942, added a further category covering "any person, not a citizen, regardless
of age, who has served or hereafter serves honorably in the military or naval forces
of the United States during the present war, and who, having been lawfully admitted
to the United States, including the territories and possessions, shall have been at the
time of his enlistment or induction a resident thereof". PuB. L. No. 507, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess. (March 27, 1942) § 701.
2. As to the maximum period, particularly the inconsistency between the wording
of Section 331 and Section 332 (a) of the Nationality Act of 1940 (7 years accord-
ing to § 331; io years according to § 332 (a)) see Hyde, Nationality Act of 5940
(1941) 35 Am. J. INT. L. 314, 316.
3. Nationality Act of 1940, §§ 102 (c), 301, 331, 54 STAT. 1138, 1140, 1153 (1940),
8 U. S. C. A. §§ 502, 701, 731 (942).
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addition to what they expressly contain, a prima facie certificate of the
holder's eligibility for naturalization.
In contradistinction to the legislation of other countries where
naturalization depends in each individual case upon the discretion of the
proper governmental agency, it is in this country independent of dis-
cretionary interference by administrative authority. In the last resort,
it is the Supreme Court of the United States that decides whether Amer-
ican citizenship by naturalization has been duly granted or denied to
an applicant.
4
To be sure, no alien has a vested right to become naturalized, and
Congress may, without infringing principles of international law or of
the Constitution, change existing naturalization procedure. The change
may even be retroactive with the result of excluding from naturaliza-
tion an alien who theretofore would have been entitled to a certificate
of citizenship.5 But at present, in the words of the late Justice Brandeis:
"There is a statutory right in the alien to submit his petition and evi-
dence to a court, to have the tribunal pass upon them, and, if the requi-
site facts are established, to receive the certificate. . . In passing upon
the application, the court exercises judicial judgment. It does not con-
fer or withhold a favor." 6
Viewed from this juristic perspective, a declarant has a legal claim
to naturalization upon fulfillment of specified requirements, subject to
certain statutory bars, e. g., those enacted with regard to enemy aliens.7
There is still another aspect involved in the declaration of intention.
The alien makes a solemn assertion that he feels more closely connected
with the United States than with his parent country and offers to cast
his lot forever with the nation which has granted him hospitality."
Against the practically constant background, just outlined, of that
particular feature of American naturalization law, there developed what
has been aptly called the "anomalous position" of declarant aliens,
4. This fact was brought before the public by some sensational cases involving
conscientious objectors. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U. S. 644 (1929) ; United
States v. Macintosh, 283 U. S. 605 (1931); United States v. Bland, 283 U. S. 636
(931). Another set of interesting cases in point is discussed by Hazard, Attachment
to the Constitution (929) 23 Am. J. INr. L. 783 et seq.
5. In re Naturalization of Aliens, I F. (2d) 594, 6oi (E. D. Wis. 1924), contains
an ingenious distinction by District Judge Geiger between what he calls "sovereign
grace" and "judicial grace".
6. Tutun v. United States and Neuberger v. United States, 27o U. S. 568, 578
(1926). See also Hazard, The Right of Appeal in Naturalization Cases (1927) 21
Am. J. INT. L. 40. Section 702 of the Second War Powers Act makes the following
exception: "During the present war, any person entitled to naturalization under sec-
tion 701 of this Act, who while serving honorably in the military or naval forces of the
United States is not within the jurisdiction of any court authorized to naturalize aliens,
may be naturalized . . . without appearing before a naturalization court." PuB. L.
No. 507, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (March 27, 1942) § 702.
7. Nationality Act of 1940, § 326, 54 STAT. 1150 (194o), 8 U. S. C. A. § 726
8T942).8. if HyiE, INTERNAIONAL- LAW (r922) 247.
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namely a status involving some rights and some duties which they do
not have in common with other non-citizens, but which they share with
citizens.
To be sure, the "alien suffrage" gradually disappeared in one
American state after another by way of amendments to their respective
constitutions. Arkansas was the last state to abolish it.9  Nor are
American passports any longer issued to declarants. Now, almost with-
out exception, privileges of a political kind are denied them.10 But
some statutes, federal and state alike, which normally reserved certain
rights and privileges in the economic and professional fields to Ameri-
can citizens, have lifted the bar with regard to declarants as such or to
specifically qualified ones.- And, what is most important, resident
declarants are subject to military duties to this country, not only in war-
time, but, according to recent statutory developments, in peacetime as
well. Are they, nevertheless, to be considered as full-fledged aliens?
Or, are they nationals, though not citizens of the United States? 12
9. It was abolished there in 1926. See Aylsworth, The Passing of Alien Suffrage
(1931) 25 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 114. For a comprehensive survey of the facts concern-
ing the alien vote as of I885, when it still existed in many American states, see BER-
nEI , THE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF ALIENS FROM THE STANDPOINT OF COMPARATIVE
JURISPRUDENCE (I885) I56 et seq. The issue whether or not the mere right to vote
was to be considered identical with acquisition of citizenship was decided in the affirm-
ative in In re Wehlitz, I6 Wis. 468 (1863) ; but in the negative in the leading case of
Lanz v. Randall, 14 FED. CAS. I3I, No. 8,o8o (C. C. D. Minn. 1876) and in City of
Minneapolis v. Reum, 56 Fed. 576 (C. C. A. 8th, 1893). A recent discussion of this
old issue may be found in Petition of Sproule, 19 F. Supp. 995 (S. D. Calif. I937). It
must be noted that the declarant, when he was granted a right to vote for the state
legislative body, indirectly acquired a share of political influence with regard to the
national government as well. In re Wehlitz, supra.
io. A Pennsylvania alien-registration statute of 1939 exempted, among other cate-
gories of aliens, specifically qualified declarants. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp.
I942) tit. 35, § 1801. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52 (1941) where this state
law was held unconstitutional on grounds not within the ambit of this article.
Ii. See the Washington statute concerning the qualification for taking or holding
an interest in land in the state of Washington. WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. (Remington,
1933) § IO,581.
For the position of declarant aliens with regard to the right to be engaged in cer-
tain professions and trades which normally are not open to aliens, see Chamberlain,
Aliens and the Right to Work (1932) i8 A. B. A. J. 329, and Chamberlain, Aliens in
the United States, in MAcKENZIE, THE LEGAL STATUS OF ALIENS IN PAcIFIC COUN-
TRIES (1937) 331.
12. The distinction between the status of an American citizen, and that of an
American national who is not an American citizen, has been "canonized" by Section
ioI (b) of the Nationality Act of 1940:
"The term 'national of the United States' means (I) a citizen of the United
States, or (2) a person who, though not a citizen of the United States, owes
permanent allegiance to the United States. It does not include an alien.' 54
STAT. 1137 (1940), 8 U. S. C. A. § 501 (1942). But, before the Nationality Act
of 1940, this bifurcation of the concept of nationality was already recognized
by distinguished authorities. REPORT OF THE CITIzENsnn' BOARD (1917), H. R. Doc.
No. 326, 59th Cong., 2d Sess. 207; Coudert, Our New Peoples: Citizens, Subjects,
Nationals or Aliens (903) 3 COL. L. REv. I3; McGovney, American Citizenship
(I9II) 1I COL. L. REV. 231, 326; I HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW (1922) 611; McGov-
ney, Our Non-Citizen Nationals, Who Are They, in RADIN, LEGAL ESSAYS (1935) 323.
For succinct discussions of the concepts of "Citizen" and of "Nationality" respec-
tively, see Hazard, Citizenship, in VI ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA (1941) 704; Garner,
Nationality, in XIX, id. at 765; Flournoy, Nationality, in XI ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES (933) 249.
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ESPOUSAL OF THE ALIEN'S CLAIMS AND PROTECTION OF His PERSON
This is, indeed, the alternative which must be viewed in an attempt
at analyzing their legal status. That they are not American citizens is
beyond any doubt. But, there is a certain confusion of official language
which appears in the fact that the term "citizen" is sometimes used as a
synonym for "nationality". This explains, perhaps, the following his-
torical phenomenon. In several conventions which this country con-
cluded at various periods of the last century with other states in order
to set up international claims commissions, the various treaties referred,
in so far as Americans were concerned, expressly to United States
"citizens". Nevertheless, in many instances the American government
espoused before such commissions claims of individuals who were,
though declarants, not American citizens; or, at least, upon whom this
status had not been conferred at the date of the event which gave
rise to the claim. More often than not, the particular commission de-
dined jurisdiction. But there are decisions to the contrary on record. It
was held, for instance, in the case of Hellman-Sprotto by the United
States Mexican Claims Commission, under the convention of July 4,
I868, "that a person declaring his intention to become a citizen and
keeping his domicile in the United States, is a citizen in the meaning of
the convention". 3
The Koszta Affair
New historical developments not infrequently revitalize an old in-
ternational "incident". So with the Kossta affair, which in a noted con-
stitutional case 14 is referred to as "one of the most remarkable episodes"
of American diplomatic history. Its facts are too well known to need
recapitulation; "I the affair was a striking instance of American naval
intervention to rescue a declarant who was kidnapped on neutral terri-
tory by agents of the State which he had left as a political refugee. This
incident occasioned Secretary of State Marcy's famous note of Sep-
tember 26, 1853.1"
Though he somewhat overreached himself in his generalizations,
especially in his self-styled "doctrine of domicile and consequent na-
13. Italics supplied. III MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY (1898) 2715. Here-
inafter cited MOORE, ARBITRATIONS.
14. In re Neagle, 135 U. S. I, 64 (1889).
15. For a succinct summary see I HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAw (1922) 687, n. 2.
16. For the full text of the Note, see H. R. EXEC. Doc. No. 1, 33d Cong., ist Sess.
(1853) 30 et seq. It is also reprinted in BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1853-
1854, Vol. 44, pp. 984 et seq. Hereinafter quoted as MARCY'S NOTE with page refer-
ences to the first mentioned American reprint. It must be noted that the extracts in
III MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST (1906) 820 et seq., do not cover all the
passages upon which emphasis is laid in the following remarks.
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tionality," 17 Mr. Marcy was" a constructive jurist with remarkable
vision in the field of international law. Illustrative of his progressive
ideas is the note on the Koszta affair. For the purpose it served, this
note was necessarily in the nature of an attorney's brief rather than a
detached statement. To prove, what was at least pleadable in the case
of Koszta, that domicile plus declaration of intention created an Amer-
ican national character,' Mr. Marcy unnecessarily made this sweep-
ing assertion: "It is a maxim of international law that domicile confers
a national character." According to him, this rule should be applied
in "determining what country has the right to protect" 19 the individual;
a statement which was surely untenable de lege lata.20
On the other hand, no historical credit has yet been paid, in the
existing comments, to one of the juristic highlights of this note: the
advancement of the modem distinction between an American citizen and
an American national who is not a citizen. The idea of such gradations
of nationality, as it were, was the red thread in Mr. Marcy's arguments.
As to Koszta's declaration of intention, he did not contend that "this
initiatory step in the process of naturalization invested him with all the
civil rights of an American citizen; but," he asserted, "it is sufficient for
all the purposes of this case to show that he was clothed with American
nationality; and, in virtue thereof, the Government of the United States
was authorized to extend to him its protection at home and abroad." 21
In this sense must also be understood the passage in President Pierce's
first annual message (1853) where it is maintained, with regard to
Koszta, "that at the time of his seizure he was clothed with the national-
ity of the United States .... ,, 22 So interpreted, Marcy's doctrine
anticipated a rather current phenomenon in the field of nationality law.
The American nationality which he claimed for Koszta was not that of
a citizen, but rather the status of an American noncitizen-national,
exemplified presently by the relationship of a Filipino to the United
States.
17. MARCY'S NOTE 43.
18. With this temperamentum, as it were, the doctrine was, in some cases, accepted
by the United States Mexican Claims Commission under the convention of July 4,
x868, when Professor Lieber acted as its umpire. See BORCHARD, DIPLOMATIC PROTEC-
TION OF CITIZENS ABROAD (1915) 574, 575. But even in this modified form, the doc-
trine was definitely disclaimed by the Department of State in official utterances sub-
sequent to the Koszta case. See, e. g., Secretary of State Bayard's Note of August 5,
1885, III MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST (i906) 847, and Secretary of State
Olney's Statement of 1896, referred to in VAN DYNE, CITIZENSHIP OF THE UNITED
STATES (1904) 75.
I9. The passages quoted are in MARcY's NOTE 40; similar passages, id. at 4r, 42.
20. According to the prevailing opinion. See- COCKBURN, NATIONALITY (I869)
122, and I HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1890) 2o8.
21. MARCY'S NOTE 40.
22. See II WHARTON, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1887) 359.
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The Piepenbrink Affair
Another instance of American intervention-this time by diplo-
matic means-to protect a declarant alien from foreign powers took
place during the first World War. August Piepenbrink, a German
citizen with American "first papers" and a steward on the American
vessel Windsor, was removed therefrom by a French navy detachment,
to be held as prisoner of war by the British in Kingston, Jamaica. The
American government undertook formal steps toward his release. The
amicable settlement which eventually closed the affair gave full satis-
faction to the American demand and set the prisoner at liberty; how-
ever, it did not contain any acknowledgment whatever of the legal con-
tentions which formed the basis for the American claim. 23 Mention
must be made, in this connection, of the fact that Piepenbrink's special
status was not the only point at issue. The American government also
maintained that his removal from a neutral ship constituted a violation
of international law regardless of his particular relationship to this
country. In this respect, Great Britain's position in the famous Trent
affair (during the Civil War period) was now adopted by the United
States.24 Nevertheless, this government's first assertion was that Piepen-
brink should be treated substantially as an American national. Reference
was made to the following provisions of a domestic statute:
"That every seaman, being an alien, shall, after his declara-
tion of intention to become a citizen of the United States and after
he shall have served three years upon such merchant or fishing
vessels of the United States, be deemed a citizen of the United
States for the purpose of serving on board of any such merchant
or fishing vessel of the United States, anything to the contrary in
any Act of Congress notwithstanding; but such seaman shall, for
all purposes of protection as an American citizen, be deemed such
after the filing of his declaration of intention to become such
citizen.1" 25
Considerations of space preclude us from discussing the general
question of whether, in the absence of any declaration of intention, alien
seamen serving on board a national vessel are under the protection of
the flag state according to customary international law.20 For our pres-
23. For the diplomatic correspondence concerning the Piepenbrink affair, see
(1915) Am. J. INT. L. (Spec. Supp.) 355 et seq.
24. The same issue appeared in the present war and was, between Great Britain
and Japan, discussed with regard to the "Asama Maru" incident.
25. REV. STAT. § 2174 (1875), as amended, 40 STAT. 544 (i98). Italics supplied.
This provision can be traced back to a substantially identical one contained in the Act
of June 7, 1872, which is discussed in VAN DYNE, CITIZENSHIP OF THE UNITED STATES
(1904) 75. Cf. the Richelieu case, id. at 76.
26. In re Ross, 140 U. S. 453, 472 (18go), though mostly referred to in the present
connection, is, we believe, not in point. This case does not deal with the problem of
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ent purposes, it is sufficient to point out that, under the above-quoted
statute, only the additional fact of possessing his "first papers" gave an
alien seaman employed on an American vessel the possibility of invok-
ing this country's protection. This statutory provision was repealed in
1935.27 However, its exact juridical bearing had been determined
before then in the famous case of Hilson v. Germany.
28
The Hilson Case
Edward A. Hilson was a radio operator on the American steam-
ship Columbian when she was stopped and sunk by a German subma-
rine in November, 1916. Hilson was a British subject, at the time,
with American "first papers". Only afterwards did he complete his
naturalization; but he was already an American citizen when his claim
for damages because of injuries and lost property came to be espoused
by the American Government before the Mixed Claims Commission.
This agency was established by the American-German agreement of
August IO, 1922, subsequent to the Treaty of Berlin of August 25,
1921. The Commission had previously set forth the prerequisites for
making a claim on behalf of an American national. Contained in Ad-
ministrative Decision V, October 31, 1924, was the following rule:
"The term 'American national' means a person wheresoever domiciled
owing permanent allegiance to the United States of America, and em-
braces not only citizens of the United States, but Indians and members
of other aboriginal tribes or native peoples of the United States and of
its territories and possessions."
In pressing Hilson's claim, the American commissioner asserted
in effect that the applicable statute squared with customary international
law; 29 to this the German commissioner objected. Denying the claim,
particularly its assertion of American nationality, Judge Parker, the
protection, but rather with the jurisdictional aspect of the situation arising in the con-
tingency of penal offences committed by aliens on board ships on the high seas.
But in the old case, McCready v. Mexico, submitted to the Claims Commission
under the convention of July 4, 1868, umpire Thornton made the well-known pronounce-
ment that "seamen serving in the naval or mercantile marine under a flag not their
own are entitled, for the duration of that service, to the protection of the flag under
which they serve". III' MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST (1906) 795, and III
MOORE, ARBITRATIONS, 2536, 2537. For a similar dictum, see the English case, The
Leon XIII, 5 Asp. Mar. Rep. 25, 26 (1882).
27. Act of June 15, 1935, 49 STAT. 376, 8 U. S. C. A. § 376 n. (1942). The idea
was one belonging to the field of labor policy, namely: to exclude so-called "three-year
certificate men" from that quota of the crew of certain vessels which has, under the
Merchant Marine Act of 1928 and similar statutes, to consist of American citizens.
79 CONG. REc. 1438, 1439, 8971 (1935). The repealing statute, by operating on that
part of the section relative to protection as well as that relating to qualification for
service, overreached this purpose in our opinion.
28. See Mixed Claims Commission, United States and Germany, Administrative
Decisions and Opinions to June -o, 1925 (Docket No. 26, February 21, 1925) 231 et seq.
29. Id. at 233, 234.
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Commission umpire, stressed the fact that Hilson became an American
citizen after the incident from which his claim arose; thus, he could not
be considered an American national within the rule of Administrative
Decision V. Referring to "permanent allegiance" as the basis of the
nationality conception, Judge Parker maintained that Hilson owed to
the United States only a temporary allegiance, limited to the duration
of his service on an American ship. According to the umpire, "It has
never been held that the mere declaration of intention to become an
American citizen constituted a tie permanently binding the declarant to
the United States". In his analysis of Section 2174, Judge Parker con-
cluded that this provision of domestic scope extended protection to an
individual in Hilson's position "not as an American national, but as an
alien seaman". 30
Judge Parker's theory in the Hilson case represents in a sense
the anticlimax to Secretary of State Marcy's plea in the Koszta affair.
Both were fully aware of the conceptual difference between the status
of an American citizen and an American national. But whereas Mr.
Marcy substantially ascribed to resident declarants the position of
noncitizen-nationals of the United States, this status was denied them
by Judge Parker. Abandoning Mr. Marcy's doctrine, the Department
of State has adopted a policy consonant with Judge Parker's opinion
in the Hilson case. In its "General Instructions for Claimants" appears
this passage:
"Nationality of Claim. The Government of the United
States can interpose effectively through diplomatic channels only
on behalf of itself, or of claimants (i) who have American
nationality (such as citizens of the United States, including com-
panies and corporations, Indians, and members of other aborig-
inal tribes, or natives of the United States or its territories or
possessions, etc.), or (2) who are otherwise entitled to American
protection in certain cases (such as certain classes of seamen on
American vessels, members of the military or naval forces of the
United States, etc.) . . . the declaration of intention to become
a citizen of the United States is insufficient to establish the right
to protection by the United States except in case of American
seamen." 31
This official policy of the American Government is in complete
accord with the classic principles of diplomatic protection. 32 Demon-
30. Id. at 237, n. i, 239, 240, n. 5.
31. Italics supplied. Reprinted in RALSTON, THE LAW AND PROCEDURE OF INTER-
NATIONAL TRIBUNALS (1926) 44o.
32. BORCHARD, DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD (1915) 572. For a
different, but not convincing opinion, see Wolfmann, Status of a Foreigner Who Has
Declared His Intention of Becoming a Citizen of the United States (907) 41 Amt. L.
REV. 498, 499, 500.
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strative of the malleability of the whole protection practice, excep-
tions 3 to the normal rule do not challenge the principle. Such irregu-
larities appear in the obverse where diplomatic protection, normally
the token of nationality, is, for cause, refused to American citizens.
34
It follows as a corollary to the principle propounded by Judge
Parker and adopted by the Department of State that a declarant alien
remains under the protection of his parent state so long as he does not
lose its nationality. 5 This is incompatible with the Marcy doctrine
that the status of an American noncitizen-national may be ascribed to
a resident declarant. Legislation designed to delineate an intermediate
status between citizenship and full-fledged alienage for resident declar-
ants has been proposed. Conceivably, such a definitive enactment might
mollify international difficulties arising out of the "double-national-
ity" 36 situation in which both the parent State and the adopted State
assert a right of protection over the individual.37 More important, in
this respect, is the issue concerning the lawfulness, internationally, of
subjecting resident aliens to compulsory military service.
MILITARY CONSCRIPTION OF DECLARANTS
Both during the Civil War and World War I, able-bodied male
declarants were made liable for service with the armed forces of the
United States. In both instances a certain avenue for withdrawing
from this legal duty was opened by amendments enacted under pressure
of foreign diplomatic representations. During the Civil War period
the military liability of duly qualified declarants was first uncondition-
ally established. But by President Lincoln's proclamation of May 8,
33. For instance, in the Bishop case (March 5, 1925, Docket No. 596) and in the
Harrison case (March II, 1925, Docket No. 2201), Mixed Claims Commission, United
States and Germany, Administrative Decisions and Opinions to June 30, 1925, 577, 586,
this country espoused, if unsuccessfully, claims associated with declarants who were
not seamen on American vessels.
34. Jessup, Revising Our Nationality Law (1934) 28 Am. J. INT. L. 104, 107,
says: ". . . protection may always be extended or withheld at the discretion of the
Secretary of State. . .
35. A collective denationalization of emigrated German Jews has been announced
by the Eleventh Decree for the Execution of the Reich Citizen Law, November 25, 1941,
I REICIISGESrrZBLATT (NOV. 26, 1941). An English translation of this novel Nazi
decree is contained in (1942) 5 CONTEMPORARY JEWISH RECORDS 202.
Cf. The diplomatic correspondence between the United States and Italy concern-
ing certain lynching cases. Some of the Italians who fell victim to these lynching in-
cidents were resident declarants. III MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST (1906)
344.
36. BORCHARD, DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD (915) 588; Art. 4
of the Hague Convention on Nationality Laws (1930) 24 Am. J. INT. L. (Special
Supp.) 193.
37. A bill with a scheme for the creation of "an intermediate status" of "non-
citizen-national of the United States" for aliens permanently residing in this country
was introduced by Congressma Gearhart on July Ii, 194o, and later died in Commit-
tee. H. R. 10,202, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (i94o).
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1863, they were allowed to retire from this obligation by leaving the
country within sixty-five days.
In the World War the Selective Draft Law of May I8, 1917,
which imposed a liability to military service upon male declarants of a
certain specified age who were "not alien enemies", was amended by
an Act of Congress of July 9, 1918. This amendment substantially
provided that a declarant of neutral nationality, subject under the stat-
ute to military service, should be relieved therefrom upon cancelling
his declaration of intention to become an American citizen. This was
supposed to have the further effect of debarring him forever from
becoming naturalized in this country. A similar provision was
embodied in the amended Selective Draft Act of August 31, 1918.38
As compared with these earlier statutes, the inclusion of resident
male declarants between certain ages among the persons liable, under
Sectioi 3 of the Burke-Wadsworth Act,39 for training and service in
the land and naval forces of the United States amounts to a novelty in
kind, and not only in degree. First, because of the permanent char-
acter of this legislation, which it has in common with some previous
militia laws; 40 second, and more important, because it transcends in
its scope the compass of a mere emergency call. The liability for
training and service under the Burke-Wadsworth Act, even though
this enactment was occasioned by an acute crisis on the international
scene, belongs to the normal relation between this country and certain
individuals, included within the statute's provisions. The correspond-
ing right to require the fulfillment of this duty is not an incident of
war-time government, but of peace-time government as well. Persons
upon whom the liability is incumbent are called upon not only when
the necessity of national defense has become actual or imminent, but at
regular intervals for the permanent purpose of securing a stock of
militarily trained man-power.
Under Section 3 in its original form the draft liability extended,
apart from citizens, to resident male declarants between the ages of
twenty-one and thirty-six. No exemption was provided for enemy
aliens, in spite of well-founded objections to this omission, raised dur-
38. But, during the Spanish-American War of 1898, able-bodied male declarants
between the ages of 18 and 45 were made liable to military service in the American
national forces without being given the possibility of withdrawing from such duty in a
legally prescribed way. 30 STAT. 361 (z898), io U. S. C. A. §i 1934).
39. 54 STAT. 885(1940), 5O U. S. C. A. § 307 (Supp. 194I), as amended, PuB. L.
No. 360, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. (Dec. 20, 1941) §3 (a).
40. 30 STAT. 361 (1898), io U. S. C. A. § I (934), referred to in II HYDE, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW (1922) § 626, n. 4, and 39 STAT. 197 (1916), 32 U. S. C. A. § I (1934),
mentioned in III WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(2d ed. 1929) I551, n. 45.
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ing the hearings on the bill.41  In contrast with the Civil War and
World War precedents, no possibility for a declarant's withdrawing
from this duty was opened, at least not expressly.
Under pressure of representations made by Mexico and other
foreign governments, Secretary of State Hull advised the alteration
of this statute in a letter to Representative Rayburn, Speaker of the
House of Representatives. 42 An amendment enacted on December 20,
1941, changing the age limits for draft eligibles, included these impor-
tant provisos:
"Provided, That any citizen or subject of a neutral country
shall be relieved from liability for training and service under this
Act if, prior to his induction into the land or naval forces, he has
made application to be relieved from such iability in the manner
prescribed by law . . . but any person who makes such applica-
tion shall thereafter be debarred from becoming a citizen of the
United States.
"Provided, That no citizen or subject of any country who
has been or may hereafter be proclaimed by the President to be
an alien enemy of the United States, shall be inducted for train-
ing and service under this Act unless he is acceptable to the land
or naval forces." 48
The amended act extended the-draft liability from citizens and resident
male declarants to "every male citizen of the United Stites, and every
other male person residing in the United States." It thus eliminated
the most striking difference between the legal position of a resident
declarant and another resident alien.4 1
The exemptions established under this amendment are dealt with
as "Class IV-C" in the Selective Service Regulations. 45  These regu-
lations lay the burden of proving alien status on the registrant claim-,
41. Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs on H. R. zo,132, 76th
Cong,, 3d Sess. (1940) 594, 595.
42. The N. Y. Times, April i7, 194o, p. 14, cols. 4, 5.
43. 54 STAT. 885, 50 U. S. C. A. § 3o7_(Supp. '94i).
44. It may be noted that the conscription law of the Confederate States embraced all
white men of certain ages who were "residents of the Confederate States". EX parte
Samuel Blumer, 21 Texas 734, 736 (i865). "To require the military service of domi-
ciled foreigners, is an undoubted and recognized right." Ex parte Samuel Blumer,
supra.
See also Art. i8o of the Dutch constitution which reads: "All citizens of the
Netherlands who are able to do so are obliged to assist in maintaining the independence
of the kingdom and in defending the territory. This obligation may also be imposed
upon residents who are not citizens". (Italics supplied.) II DODD, MODEM CONSTU-
TION (igog) 115, and WIjTnorF, DE STAATSINiCHTnNG VAN NDi.RMua (3d ed.
1935) 406.
A similar provision was already contained in Art. 8 of the famous Union of Ut-
recht (January 29, 1579). That there is 'a substantial difference in status between a
resident alien (ingezetenen) and any other alien (vremdelingen) is thus a time hon-
ored rule of Dutch law.
45. Part 622 § 6= .
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ing release on such ground. 46 According to the prescribed rules, the
"Application by Alien for Relief from Military Service" (Form 30)
shall be disregarded "if registrant is a national of the United States
but also contends that he is a citizen or subject of a neutral country
or an alien enemy".
Between the amended Selective Service Act 47 and the abortive
Senate Bill, S. 1397, which it supplanted, significant differences are
to be observed. Introduced on April 25, 1941, at the State Depart-
ment's insistence 48 by Senator Reynolds, it purported to be "a bill to
provide for the exemption from military service of certain aliens resid-
ing in the United States".
The Senate proposal retained the traditional distinction, with
regard to compulsory military service, between resident declarants and
other resident aliens. In the original Selective Service Act only such
aliens who had declared their intention to become American citizens
were subject to conscription; this provision was embodied in S. 1397.
But under the new amendment, "every male citizen of the United
States and every other male person residing in the United States" is
classified as a military eligible; thus, every resident noncitizen, irre-
spective of any declaration of intention, may be inducted into the mili-
tary forces.
49
In the Senate bill was an escape clause, permitting application for
relief from military service even after the alien has been inducted into
the army, provided his application was made "within a time fixed by
the President". Under the amended Act, however, in order to be effec-
tual the applicant's petition must be presented before his induction. 0
46. Corresponding to the judicial practice developed by the federal courts in cases
which arose from the World War I draft. Cf. II Hvnr. INTERMATIONAL LAW (1922)
254, n. 3.
47. 54 STAT. 885, 50 U. S. C. A. § 307 (Supp. 194).
48. See SEN. REP. No. 394, 77th Cong., ist Sess. (1941) 3, 4.
49. Consequently, the following are categories of persons who, while not American
citizens, but nevertheless resident in this country, are now subject to the draft obliga-
tion: such American nationals who are ineligible for American citizenship and con-
sequently not admitted to a declaration of intention; such fullfledged aliens who are,
on account of their race or for other reasons, ineligible for American citizenship;
such fuilfledged aliens who are exempted, under the naturalization law, from the re-
quirement of a declaration of intention and were obviously overlooked when the orig-
inal Selective Training and Service Act came to be drafted; finally and most important,
those fullfledged aliens who, though eligible for citizenship, preferred not to make a
declaration of intention. See also: Graham, Are Latin American Students Subject
to the Draft? (1942) 1o GEao. WAsH. L. R v. 845.
There remains, however, the fact that according to Section 5 (a), as amended in
December, 194, the President's discretionary authority to specify categories of per-
sons to be relieved from liability for training and service extends only to such resident
non-citizens who have not made a declaration of intention. See H. R. REP,. No. 15o8,
77th Cong., Ist Sess. (ig4i) 4.
5o. The rationale for the more liberal standpoint recommended by the Department
of State was indicated by Capt. Francis V. Keesling, Jr. Hearings before Committee
on Military Affairs on S. 2126, 77th Cong., ist Sess. (1941) 46.
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In its escape clause, the Senate bill suggested no different treat-
ment for enemy aliens as distinguished from other alien draftees. But
under the law as enacted, the application to be relieved from the lia-
bility for training and service can be made only by a "citizen or sub-
ject of a neutral country". 51 The situation of an enemy alien is cov-
ered by a special provision. His induction into military service lies
entirely within the discretion of proper military authorities, for the act
stipulates that any such alien may be inducted if "he is acceptable to
the land or naval forces." 52
Possibly, this provision might be construed as conflicting with
Article 23 (h) of the Hague Regulations concerning the Laws and
Customs of War on Land which forbids "a belligerent to compel the
nationals of the hostile party to take part in the operations of war
directed against their own country, even if they were in the belligerent's
service before the commencement of the war".5 3  Whether this pro-
hibition is applicable to an individual who possesses the nationality of
both countries is an unresolved question. The Italian War Law of
1938 answers in the negative.54 As to the normal contingency of single
nationality, Article 23 (h) may cause some difficulty in its practical
application to so-called "friendly enemy aliens". 5- And a further ques-
tion may be raised: whether the mere induction of an enemy alien into
military service makes him, in terms of the Hague Convention, a par-
ticipant "in the operations of war" directed against his own country.
56
Two sorts of diplomatic objections to the drafting of resident
declarants had been mentioned in the State Department's letter to Sen-
ator Reynolds, 57 chairman of the Military Affairs Committee: Mexico
51. PUB. L. No. 360, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (Dec. 20, 1941) § 3 (a).
52. Ibid.
53. Farther than the wording of Art. 23 (h) Hague Regulations, but probably not
farther than its purpose, goes this statement, made by a delegate of the Judge Advo-
cate General of the Navy: "Every modern authority on international law holds with-
out exception that alien enemies may not be forced to serve in the armed forces of a
belligerent." (Italics supplied.) Hearings before Committee on Military Affairs on
H. R. 10,132, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) 595.
54. Art. 37 of the Legge di Guerra, concerning the prohibition to compel enemy
subjects to participate in "belligerent actions" (azioni di guerra) against their country,
contains the following passage: ". . . the provision of the foregoing paragraph does
not apply to enemy subjects who at the same time possess the Italian nationality... "
(Author's translation.) See XVI RACCoLTA UFFICIALE DELLE LaGGI i DacREri (1938)
2478, 2482.
Article i of the Protocol concerning military obligations in certain cases of double
nationality, concluded at the Hague Conference on April 12, 193o, is, we submit, not in
point. It does not, we believe, cover the particular contingency of a state of war be-
tween the two or more countries whose nationality a given individual possesses simul-
taneously.
55. Captain Keesling pointed out that "there are a number of people who are tech-
nically enemy aliens but who actually are just aching to get at the country of which
they are nationals and of which they happen to be the minority groups". Hearings
before Committee on Military Affairs on S. 2126, 77th Cong., ist Sess. (i4i) 49.
56. See note 53 supra.
57. See note 48 supra.
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grounded its complaint upon alleged principles of international law;
Germany, Spain and Switzerland based their representations on exist-
ing treaty obligations of the United States.
Commenting on Mexico's objection, the Department of State con-
ceded that the American government itself had "indeed on numerous
occasions in the past . . . objected to the compulsory military serv-
ice of its nationals in the armed forces of foreign states, even in the
absence of treaty provisions guaranteeing such exemptions." 58 Secre-
taries of State Madison and Seward are on record with statements to
this effect,59 while on September 26, 1917, Secretary of State Lansing
admitted "the principle of international law preventing the compulsory
drafting of neutral aliens", except "if the Nation is called upon to
resist an invasion".60 The American World War practice of conscript-
ing resident declarants found the approval of a distinguished author-
ity,61 but its validity has never been established by a decision of the
Supreme Court.i
2
European legislators have not so far provided for the compulsory
military service of resident aliens, except for individuals without
nationality and "quasi-stateless" persons. Writers on international
law mostly deny the lawfulness of subjecting nationals of a foreign
58. The United States made, however, a "reservation" to Article 3 of the HABANA
CONVENTION ON THE STATUS OF ALIENS (1928) which reads:
"Foreigners may not be obliged to perform military service; but those foreigners
who are domiciled, unless they prefer to leave the country, may be compelled, under
the same conditions as nationals, to perform police, fire-protection or militia duty for
the protection of the place of their domicile against natural catastrophes or dangers
not resulting from war." (1928) 22 AM. J. INT. L., OFFICIAL DOcUMENTS 137.
The Hague Conference for the Codification of International Law (93o) did,
apart from the Protocol relating to military obligations in certain cases of double na-
tionality, not deal with the problem of compulsory military service of resident aliens.
But the International Conference on Treatment of Foreigners, held at Paris, Novem-
ber 5th-December 5th, 1929, proposed the conclusion of a multilateral convention to
the effect that the nationals of each of the contracting Parties "shall also be exempt in
the territory of the other High Contracting Parties, in peace time and in war time,
from all compulsory military service, whether in the army, navy or air forces, or in
the national guard or militia, and from all compulsory services in connection with na-
tional defense. . . ." League of Nations Document, C. 97, M.23 (930) 441, 523.
This proposal was never carried out.
59. IV MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST (19o6) 5 2 , 53.
6o. Hearings before Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives on
S. I. Res. 84, 65th Cong., ist Sess. (1917) 4, io.
61. II HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW (1922) 244, 246, 247. Comment thereon in
Gibbons, The Selective Service Acts of 1917 and 1940 (i94) 9 Gao. WASH. L. REV.
687, 689, n. 18. Cf. also the unsigned Comment, Aliens under the Selective Draft Act
(1917-1918) 27 YALE L. J. 683; Edmunds, Aliens and the Draft (1920) 5 ST. Louis
L. REV. 23; III WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (2d
ed. 1929) 1556, 1557; Mickelwait, Legal Basis for Conscription (940) 26 A. B. A. J.
701, 704.
See also Fitzhugh and Hyde, The Drafting of Neutral Aliens by the United
States (142) 36 Am. J. INT. L. 369.
62. The opinion in Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366 (0918) does not
touch upon this particular problem even though it speaks of the "reciprocal obligation
of the citizen to render military service". Id. at 378.
But, an acrimonious criticism of the drafting of declarants was voiced by a lower
court in In re Siem, 284 Fed. 868, 870 (D. Mont. 1922).
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country to military conscription. 3 But this is sometimes qualified with
regard to "enrollment for police purposes and local protection, espe-
cially in times of sudden emergency".
6 4
De lege ferenda, it may be mentioned that about twenty years ago
a noted scholar submitted the revolutionary suggestion of supplanting
"the outworn conception of allegiance" by a status of being "perma-
nently settled" in a country "with no definite intention of departing
therefrom"; a test which should be applied, according to him, also
with regard to "whom the state may force into its armies".6 5
The complaints against conscription of "treaty nationals", ex-
empted from military service by various bilateral conventions,6 6 are
grounded primarily upon two types of clauses which occur in United
States treaties.67  The older one which, in varying language, appears
as late as I92O,68 substantially enjoins that "the citizens or subjects of
each of the High Contracting Parties shall be exempt in the territories
of the other from all compulsory military service, by land or by sea
)" 60 The more modern clause, adopted for the first time in Arti-
cle 6 of the treaty of commerce with Germany, December 8, 1923,
posits a marked distinction between resident declarants and other treaty
nationals. It has the following stereotyped text:
"In the event of war between either high contracting party
and a third State, such party may draft for compulsory military
service nationals of the other having a permanent residence within
its territories and who have formally, according to its laws, de-
clared an intention to adopt its nationality by naturalization, unless
such individuals depart from the territories of said belligerent party
within sixty days after a declaration of war." 70
63. See, e. g-, i OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW (Lauterpacht's 5th ed. 1937)
237, 238.
64. BORCHARD, DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD (1915) 65, 66.
65. Baty, The Interconnection of Nationality and Domicile, in WIGORE, CELE-
BRATED LEGAL ESSAYS (1919) 187, 197, 198, reprinted in (1918-1919) 13 ILL. L. REV.
363, 373, 374. See also BATY, THE CANONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1930) 367.
66. Their conclusion was recommended by the third voen of the Hague Peace
Conference of 1907.
67. Apart from the obviously obsolete convention, "providing for reciprocal mili-
tary service", which were, in 1918, concluded with the then allied Governments of
France, Great Britain, Greece, and Italy respectively.
68. Examples: Art. V of the Treaty with Spain (1902), II MALLOY, TREATIES,
CONVENTIONS, ETC., BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER POWERS (1910) 1703;
and Art. I of the Treaty with Siam (1920), U. S. Treaty Series, No. 655.
69. Language in Art. V of the Treaty with Spain, note 68 supra.
70. (1926) 2o AM. J. INT. L. (OFF. Doc.) 7. The same clause is contained in
Art. 6 of the treaties of commerce with (in chronological order) : Hungary (June 24,
I925), Salvador (February 22, 1926), Honduras (December 7, I927), Latvia (April
20, 1928), Norway (June 5, 1928), Austria (June 19, 1928).
According to the letter of the Department of State, note 48 supra, Germany con-
strued the treaty to mean that neither party has a right to draft declarants unless it is
at war, and the Department of State added: "Such a consruction is probably justified."
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The method suggested by the State Department and substantially
adopted by the amended Act, intended to parry critical thrusts directed
at American practices by other governments, does not distinguish
"treaty nationals" from other aliens; nor is there an attempt to cate-
gorize separately such nationals according to provisions of the treaties
with their respective countries. The drafted citizen of a neutral coun-
try upon application is given a certain possibility of being relieved from
his liability for training and service. The underlying philosophy seems
to be that in his not filing an application there is implied an expression
of his will to serve voluntarily in this country's armed forces, a "con-
structive enlistment," as it were. 71  Whether this is conclusive and
whether it is likely to allay foreign resentment against the earlier stat-
ute, it is impossible to consider within the limits of this discussion. It
is sufficient to suggest that the number of persons over whom bona fide
international controversies could arise would be considerably reduced
by an American law creating the possibility of an intermediate status
of noncitizen-national of the United States for a resident declarant.
CONCLUSION
As to this country, an individual who has made a declaration of
intention to become a citizen under the naturalization law remains, nor-
mally, a full-fledged alien, irrespective of his residence. It may plausi-
bly be maintained that declarants enrolled in the armed forces are, for
the duration of their service, noncitizen-nationals. 72  But this possible
variation from the normal status of alienage is open to contention.
With due regard to the international limits of the domestic domain
(dornaine riservi) in questions of nationality law, it is the receiving
country alone which has the final determination of an immigrant's
admission to the status of a national. That the American law does
not single out declarants, or resident declarants, as vested with a legal
standing different from full-fledged alienage, is established beyond
doubt by the enemy alien status ascribed to them in the event that the
country of their origin becomes a belligerent against the United
States."
71. A theory of "constructive enlistment" was, on another occasion, expounded in
an opinion of the Judge Advocate General (June 21, I918). SCHILLER, MILITARY LAW
AND DEFENSE LEGIsLATioN (1941) io8.
72. See Prince Elie de Bourbon, Cour de Cassation, May 14, 1923, (1923) I DAL-
LOZ, JURISPRUDENCE, io8, and the award of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The
Hague (May 22, 1909) concerning the Casablanca incident between France and Ger-
many. (1909) 3 Am. J. INT. L. 755.
73. Section 326 of the Nationality Act of 1940, 54 STAT. 1150 (1940), 8 U. S. C.
A. § 726 (1942). Regarding the previous law, see Ex parte Graber, 247 Fed. 882 (N.
D. Ala. 1918).
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As the law now stands, not the declaration of intention coupled
with American residence, but rather the mere circumstance of residence
in the United States is the fact which generates an alien's duties under
the Selective Training and Service Act. As for the wider relation
betwecn an alien and the country in which he is settled, before con-
summation of the naturalization process it amounts to no more than
a temporary, as distinguished from so-called permanent allegiance.
7 4
This seems to be the almost unanimously accepted theory. A decision
of the British Privy Council which went a long way in the opposite
direction has been ingeniously discredited by a noted scholar.75
Whether the present law should be revised to create an intermedi-
ate status of noncitizen-national "' for resident declarants is a question
which deserves serious consideration.
77
The beneficiary of such a legal reform would be this country. Bona
fide foreign protests against the drafting of foreign citizens or nationals
would be obviated if these individuals were, under United States law,
nationals of this country. For according to the 193o Hague Conference
Protocol concerning military obligations in certain cases of double na-
tionality, "a person possessing two or more nationalities who habitually
resides in one of the countries whose nationality he possesses and who
is in fact most closely connected with that country, shall be exempt from
all military obligations in the other country or countries." 78 Thus, as
to his military obligations, the country of the individual's residence pre-
vails over the country to which he only technically belongs. The provi-
sions of this multilateral treaty, though primarily conventional interna-
tional law, are generally understood as being declarative of customary
international law as well. Under this assumption, the conscription of
resident declarants would be immune against justified diplomatic pro-
test if they were American nationals, though not American citizens.
Further, with the creation of this intermediate status the United
States would be privileged under international law to exercise diplo-
matic protection over resident declarants, except as against any country
to which they have an equal claim of nationality. Whether this privilege
is to be utilized lies within the discretion of the Department of State;
74. Even though "temporary allegiance", as a technical term for the tie between
a state and its nationals, nowadays does not mean that this tie cannot be severed, but
rather "that so long as it continues it exists whether the national is for the moment in
the territory of the state or abroad". I WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONXL LAW (2d ed. igio)
2o6. Cf. Carlisle v. United States, 16 Wall. 147, 154 (U. S. 1872).
75. Baty's note in (1908) 33 THE LAW MAGAZINE AND REVIEW 214, critically dis-
cussing the decision in De Jager v. Attorney General of Natal, [19o7] A. C. 326.
76. One of the conditions should consist of the willingness of the applicant to re-
nounce his foreign allegiance, if he possesses any, simultaneously with the acquisition
of the intermediate status.
77. See the bill H. R. 1O,2O2, mentioned in note 37 supra.
78. See note 54 supra.
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for, even as to citizens the privilege is not a duty under international
or domestic law. Reverting to antiquity, it is to be noted that in Athens
the mnetoecs (resident aliens), while on the one hand liable to compulsory
military service, were, on the other hand placed under the official pro-
tection of the Athenian people.79
To the resident declarant would accrue the benefit of diplomatic
protection, though he would remain excluded from the rights and privi-
leges inherent in American citizenship. He would enjoy the great
moral advantage of legally belonging to the national community with
which he has factually cast his lot; and the immigrant's "man without
a country" feeling, especially generic to political refugees, would be
largely dissipated.
In President Cleveland's annual message of I885 he wrote: "The
rights which spring from domicile in the United States, especially when
coupled with a declaration of intention to become a citizen, are worthy
of definition by statute. The stranger coming hither with intent to
remain, establishing his residence in our midst, contributing to the gen-
eral welfare, and by his voluntary act declaring his purpose to assume
the responsibilities of citizenship, thereby gains an inchoate status which
legislation may properly define." 80
79. I PHILLIPsoN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CusToM OF ANCIENT GREECE
AND ROME (1911) I68, 172.
8o. VIII RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS 1798-1897 (I898) 336.
